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This paper examines informal redistribution in the form of work in small and medium enterprises in Kampala, Uganda and its drivers. Using a field experiment, we show that employers and workers systematically choose giving/receiving work over cash transfers. Decisions imply a large willingness to pay for work on both sides of the labor market. Work redistribution choices are unaffected by the economic and training value of the task, and employers pay for zero marginal product work. Removing stakes in the game also does not affect decisions, ruling out signaling and relational personal benefits as drivers. Employers and workers motivate work redistribution mostly with fairness considerations and, secondly, with the psychosocial value of work for workers. Results appear externally valid, as giving via work predicts increased hiring in the firm, but it does not lead to higher revenues, sales, or profits, confirming that work redistribution is unlikely to be productive.

We study the mental health of graduate students and faculty at 14 Economics departments in Europe. Using clinically validated surveys sent out in the fall of 2021, we find that 34.7% of graduate students experience moderate to severe symptoms of depression or anxiety and 17.3% report suicidal or self-harm ideation in a two-week period. Only 19.2% of students with significant symptoms are in treatment. 15.8% of faculty members experience moderate to severe depression or anxiety symptoms, with prevalence higher among non-tenure track (42.9%) and tenure track (31.4%) faculty than tenured (9.6%) faculty. We estimate that the COVID-19 pandemic accounts for about 74% of the higher prevalence of depression symptoms and 30% of the higher prevalence of anxiety symptoms in our European sample relative to a 2017 U.S. sample of economics graduate students. We also document issues in the work environment, including a high incidence of sexual harassment, and make recommendations for improvement.

This study explores the economic implications of obesity in low-income countries, where it serves as an unhealthy yet significant status symbol. By conducting experiments with decision-makers in Kampala, Uganda, who were shown portraits with manipulated weight, the research uncovers four key insights. Firstly, obesity is predominantly viewed as an indicator of wealth rather than attractiveness or health. Secondly, obesity enhances credit access; in a practical experiment with loan officers, the advantage of obesity equates to a 60% increase in reported earnings. Thirdly, the obesity premium diminishes when additional financial information is available, highlighting the role of asymmetric information. Lastly, the perceived benefits of obesity and its value as a wealth signal are often exaggerated, which inadvertently increases the cost of adopting healthier lifestyles.

The future of an institution, such as the European Union, ultimately depends on people’s support. This paper investigates whether EU redistributive policies have improved public attitudes towards European integration, both in terms of public opinion and political preferences. We focus on Cohesion Policy funds, whose allocation allows us to single out these effects by means of a regression discontinuity approach. The results show that EU transfers have mitigated the rise of Eurosceptical attitudes and reduced political consensus for anti-EU parties. The effects are homogeneous across different socio-economic groups, including the most disadvantaged ones. The improvement in public support for the EU does not appear to be exclusively a spillover of the positive economic effect of funding; we show evidence suggesting the existence of a ‘reciprocity-effect’ channel, i.e. citizens in recipient regions recognize the beneficial role of the EU as the source of funding.

Organizational frictions shape how firms hire. We study their consequences for hiring discrimination. In an experiment across three male-dominated sectors in Uganda, 915 employers evaluate profiles of vocational trainees to hire on probation. We randomize profile gender and performance signals, and offers of audits to prevent theft or harassment. Under business-as-usual, female profiles are 10.6 percentage points less likely to be selected. Theft audits increase only male selection, raising this penalty by 56%; harassment audits increase only female selection and close the gap. Neither audit changes beliefs about candidate attributes. The effects are consistent with frictions raising the value of perceived trustworthiness, on which women are viewed favorably, and worries about women's exposure to harassment. Technical skill signals raise selection but do not explain the gap, and a complementary experiment with trainees does not support employers' beliefs that women are less skilled, nor that men are less honest. Thus, the status-quo gap conceals inaccurate statistical discrimination against men and a larger underlying bias against women. This provides direct evidence of a second-best problem: theft audits offset the first but amplify the hiring consequences of the second. Because gender signals several attributes, estimated bias depends on which ones researchers observe and treat as productive: in our setting, it ranges from 1.68 to 16.57 percentage points.

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